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Rhodes: Ancillary Jurisdiction--Rule 14--Disposition of Third Party Claim

NOTES
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION -RULE
14-DISPOSITION OF THIRD PARTY
CLAIM WHEN THE PRIMARY CLAIM HAS
BEEN DISMISSED
The problem considered herein involves the scope of ancillary
jurisdiction as applied to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but more specifically it is an attempt to delineate what
criteria the courts have considered when exercising discretion (where it
was allowed) in determining whether it should dismiss an ancillary
third party claim after the principal claim has been dismissed.
I.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION

Ancillary jurisdiction is a unique concept which allows federal
courts to hear cases over which no jurisdiction is conferred, either by
the Constitution or by statutes.' The concept gives the federal courts
power over an entire controversy, allowing them to decide matters or
claims which are incidental or ancillary to the main claim or
controversy that is properly before them. No independent grounds for
2
jurisdiction over these incidental controversies need be established.
Thus, in the third party practice, established by Rule 14 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as long as jurisdiction is established between
the original plaintiff and defendant, no independent grounds for
jurisdiction need be established between the defendant (third party
plaintiff) and the third party defendant. They may have a common
citizenship, and the controversy between them may involve purely a
state claim and be less than the jurisdictional amount of $10,000.00.3
Ancillary jurisdiction grew out of cases where the federal courts
had some res in its actual or constructive possession. 4 By necessity
power was needed to dispose of the entire res without threatening the
1. 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23, at 93
(Wright ed. 1960) [Hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTZOFF].
2. Id.
3. IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 424, at 650.
4. 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 23, at 94.
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parties involved with the possibility of inconsistent results which might
occur if part of the case were litigated in state courts and part in federal
courts. 5 Such a problem was recognized and resolved in Freeman v.
Howe6 which said that any party whose interests are affected by an
action in federal court in which that court has taken control of property
may, in order to prevent injustice, assert his claim to the property in
federal court. The Court further said that such a claim would be
ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to the original suit out
of which it has arisen, and maintained without reference to the
citizenship of the parties.7 Once federal courts had the res before it, a
state court could not thereafter obtain jurisdiction, but any person
could assert their claim thereto in federal court."
Except for obscure exceptions,' prior to 1926 the general rule was
that ancillary jurisdiction was limited to cases where the federal court
had actual or constrictive possession of some property or res."' In 1926
the Supreme Court in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange"U gave
ancillary jurisdiction its modern impetus and enabled the concept to
become one of major importance."2 The Court, construing old Federal
Equity Rule 30, now Rule 13(a), relating to compulsory counterclaims,
held that the federal court could grant relief sought by a compulsory
counterclaim even though the principal claim had been dismissed on its
merits and no independent grounds of jurisdiction over the
counterclaim existed. No precedent was cited to support the
conclusion. The rationale was that to hold otherwise would rob the
compulsory counterclaim requirement of Equity Rule 30 of all its
serviceable meaning, and that the principal claim and counterclaim
were so closely connected that in order to do complete justice to the
parties the failure of the former would establish the foundation for the
latter.' 3 It would be illogical to require that a counterclaim be brought
and then not grant the relief sought, after the facts upon which it arose
5. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450 (1860).
6. Id., at 460.

7. Id.
8. id.
9. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 20 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT].
10. Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925).
11. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
12. WRIGHT § 9, at 20.
13. 270 U.S. at 610.
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had been fully litigated and the principal claim had failed. An opposite
holding would require the successful defendant to relitigate the same
facts in the state court to obtain the relief sought by the compulsory
counterclaim.
Generally, ancillary jurisdiction now attaches in situations: (1)
where the ancillary matter arises from the same transaction which was
the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during the course of the main
proceeding, or is an integral part of the main proceeding; (2) where the
ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial new factfinding proceeding; (3) where determination of the ancillary matter
through an ancillary order would not deprive a party of a substantial
procedural or substantive right; and (4) where the ancillary matter
must be settled to protect the integrity of the main proceeding or to
insure that the disposition in the main proceeding will not be
frustrated."
Since Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the Federal Rules will not expand federal jurisdiction, Moore v.
The New York Cotton Exchange'5 has been used by the federal courts
as a foundation upon which to expand the concept of ancillary
jurisdiction in order to effectuate some of the Federal Rules which
permit joinder of claims and joinder of parties.'" While ancillary
jurisdiction has been expanded, the reasoning for its existence has
remained basically the same, that is to prevent inconsistent results
which might occur if separate trials of the same basic facts were
required."
14. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 740 (D.C. 1969). Only the first
two situations are involved in the application of ancillary jurisdiction to Rule 14
Impleader.
15. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
16. WRIGHT § 9, at 20; see Fraser, AncillaryJurisdictionand the Joinderof Claims

in the Federal Courts,33 F.R.D. 27 (1963). It is now the general consensus that ancillary
jurisdiction applies: to compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a) and 13(h); to crossclaims, under Rule 13(g); to impleader of a third party defendant, under Rule 14; to the
joinder of federal and state claims, under Rule 18, when the two claims are so closely
related as to reasonably expect both claims to be litigated in one trial; interpleader, under
Rule 22; and intervention as of right, under Rule 24(a). WRIGHT § 9, at 21.
17. State of Maryland, to the Use of Wood v. Robinson, 74 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md.
1947); see generally Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 738-40 (D.C. 1969);
IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 422, at 644; 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 23, at 96.
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II.

RULE 14

AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION

It is well settled that ancillary jurisdiction applies to Rule 14,11
relating to impleader or the third party practice. Rule 1411 is a rule of
procedure20 which is invoked principally in cases concerning indemnity,
subrogation, contribution, and breach of warranty. 2' It operates when
the original defendant claims that a third party is or may be liable to
him for all or part of the claim asserted by the plaintiff against him. It
is, however, fatal to impleader for the defendant to allege that the third
party is liable solely to the original plaintiff." The rule is intended to
avoid a multiplicity of suits and to dispose of the entire subject matter
arising from one set of facts in one suit, thus avoiding inconsistent
results and the prejudice which might result thereby. z3 This rule also
allows a party to be brought into the case who may have the same
citizenship as either the original plaintiff or defendant." An example of
the application of Rule 14 follows: A sues B, a retailer, on breach of
warranty when a defective product bought by A from B injures A and
the proximate cause of the injury is alleged to have been the defect; A
and B are citizens of different states and the amount of the claim
exceeds $10,000.00. Under the rule, B is allowed to implead C from
whom he bought the product, even though B and C are citizens of the
same state, since C is liable to B for any damages B may have to pay A
if A is successful in his suit against B.21 Both claims involve the same
set of facts to be proved, that is, that the product was defective. If both
claims were not litigated in one trial, the original defendant, B, might
lose the primary suit in the federal court against A and also lose the suit
against C in the state court due to inconsistent findings in separate
courts as to whether the product was defective. Clearly, ancillary
jurisdiction should apply in such situations to confer federal
18. IA BARRON &HOLTZOFF § 424, at 650-51, and the many cases cited in note 22
therein.
19. Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of plaintiff's claim against him

. .

. Any party may move to

strike the third-party claim, or for its severance or separate trial.
20. WRIGHT § 76, at 332.
21. Id., at 333-34.
22. Id., at 335-36.

23. Id., at 333.
24. Id., at 336.
25. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2)(b).
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jurisdiction over the third party claim against C. But, suppose A and B
settle their controversy and the primary suit is dismissed. What should
be the disposition of the third party suit which has no, independent
grounds of federal jurisdiction?
11I.

POWER TO AJUDICATE

The general rule is that jurisdiction over an ancillary claim is not
lost when the principal claim has been settled or dismissed on its
merits.26 Dery v. Wyer, 27 a leading case for this proposition, reasoned
that sufficiency of federal jurisdiction should be determined at the
commencement of the action and if found to be present then it should
continue until final disposition of all claims. 28The court, persuaded by
policy considerations, felt that a contrary holding in many cases would:
result in a serious waste of effort by both the judge and the litigants;
discourage settlements during the course of litigation; discourage
ajudications on motions and settlements in advance of trial; create
confusion as to when ancillary jurisdiction is lost; prejudice the
ancillary claimant whose claim may then be time-barred; and seriously
impair the utility of many of the Federal Rules and generate many
sterile jurisdictional disputes.2 The holding was limited solely to the
power to ajudicate and not discretion to ajudicate, discussed infra, but
the existence and utility of ajudicatory discretion were acknowledged. 0
Clearly this was jurisdiction conferred for the sake of convenience, as
32
was Moore,3 and the dissent recognized it as such.
The Dery case is supported by the recent Supreme Court case of
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,33 a case involving pendent
26. IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 424, at 658; WRIGHT § 76, at 338.
27. 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959). This appeal was only on the merits of the third

party claim, but the court of appeals directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs
addressed to the question of whether the trial court had jurisdictional power to ajudicate
the third party claim after the primary claim had been dismissed on its merits.
28. Id., at 809.
29. Id., at 809-10.
30. Id.. at 810. Since the question of power to ajudicate the third party claim was
not raised until the case reached the court of appeals, the trial court had no opportunity
to exercise any discretion. The Dery court pointed out that its decision was not
contradictory to cases allowing discretion to ajudicate the third party claim under such
circumstances since those cases must presupposepower to ajudicate the third party claim.
265 F.2d at 809.
31. 270 U.S. 593 (1926); see WRIGHT § 9, at 20.
32. 265 F.2d, at 811.
33. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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jurisdiction, a special branch of ancillary jurisdiction.' Gibbs held that
where a substantial federal (principal) claim was presented, the federal
court had power to ajudicate related state (pendent) claims, even if the
federal claim was later dismissed, if they derived from a common
nucleus of operative facts so as to reasonably expect both the federal
and state claims to be tried in one judicial proceeding.
IV.

DISCRETION TO AJUDICATE

Although the federal courts have power to ajudicate the ancillary
third party claim after the principal claim has been dismissed, in the
exercise of discretion they have the power to dismiss the ancillary
claim. 3 5 In Duke v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.36 the court, in
recognizing a basic policy consideration stated that:
[t]he federal courts were not intended for the trial of cases
involving no federal question, between citizens of the same State,
which the State courts are fully competent to try. And we should
discourage attempts by litigants to ride into federal courts on the
coattails7 of a distantly related, but quite dissimilar, original civil
action.1
Another policy to be considered is that ancillary jurisdiction rests only
upon the need to avoid the substantial likelihood of prejudice to a
litigant in federal court which might result from his being compelled to
relitigate facts in a state court which have been litigated in federal
court. When this substantial likelihood of prejudice is lacking, the
ancillary claim should ordinarily be dismissed."
In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,3" the Court said
that:
[i]t has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a
34. 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 23, at 97. Pendent jurisdiction arises when the

principal claim raises a federal question and thus is within the jurisdiction of the federal
court, while other purely state claims, joined by the plaintiff and arising from the same
nucleus of operative facts, lack any independent jurisdictional grounds. The concept of

pendent jurisdiction gives the federal courts power to ajudicate these purely state claims
along with the federal claim. The considerations supporting its existence are the same as

for ancillary jurisdiction.
35. Duke v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 209 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 966 (1954); see IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 424, at 658; WRIGr § 76,
at 338.
36. 209 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 966 (1954).

37. Id., at 209.
38. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion).
39. 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see note 34 supra.
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doctrine of discretion, not of . . . right. Its justification lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to
40
exercise jurisdiction over state claims ....

While many cases do not specifically mention these considerations, it is
evident that they were the basis for disposing of the ancillary claim. An
analysis of the cases will be helpful in determining what criteria were
involved when the courts exercised discretion in disposing of the
ancillary claim after the primary claim had been dismissed and there
were no independent grounds of jurisdiction to supp'ort the ancillary
claim.
V.

A.

DISMISSAL OF THE PRIMARY CLAIM BEFORE TRIAL

Ancillary Claim Dismissed

When the primary claim has been dismissed before trial, the
general rule is to also dismiss the ancillary third party claim.', The
reason for this rule is that impleader is allowed only because of
economy of time and costs in trying all issues in one trial and the
avoidance of proving the same set of facts in two separate suits. The

ancillary third party suit should be dismissed when these considerations
cease to exist.4" Another reason has been that to ajudicate the third
party suit in such a situation would be an extension of federal
jurisdiction in violation of Rule 82. 41

It is interesting to note that the policy considerations supporting
the Dery" holding would probably dictate the trial court's
discretionary dismissal of the ancillary claim if the facts of that case
40. Id., at 726.
41. E.K. Carey Drilling Co. v. Murphy, 113 F. Supp. 226 (D. Colo. 1953); Thomas
Worcester, Inc. v. Clover Stores Corp., 11 F.R.D. 334 (N.D.N.Y. 1951); State of
Maryland to Use of Wood v. Robinson, 74 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md. 1947). This rule is
supported by United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) which
stated that "[i]f the federal (principal] claims are dismissed before trial ... the state
[pendent or ancillary] claims should be dismissed as well." Id. at 726.
42. Thomas Worcester, Inc. v. Clover Stores Corp., 11 F.R.D. 334 (N.D.N.Y.
195 1); State of Maryland to Use of Wood v. Robinson, 74 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md. 1947).
43. E.K. Carey Drilling Co. v. Murphy, 113 F. Supp. 226 (D. Colo. 1953); Thomas
Worcester, Inc. v. Clover Stores Corp., F.R.D. 334 (N.D.N.Y. 1951). Rule 82 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .
44. 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
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arose today.45 For example, little if any judicial energy has been spent,
since the principal claim has been settled in the pleading stage shortly
after the ancillary third party claim had been filed;"8 the ancillary claimant had not been prejudiced since his claim was not time-barred;47 all
the parties apparently knew when the principal claim had been settled
so there could have been no confusion as to when the ancillary claim
was required to stand on its own;4" and the utility of Rule 14 would not
have been impaired since there was no danger of inconsistent results by
49
two separate courts.
0 after disposing of
The court in United States v. HouffA
the
principal claim by summary judgment, invited a motion for dismissal
of the ancillary claim since proof of different sets of facts would have
been required to dispose of the principal and ancillary claims. It
implied that impleader had been improvidently granted initially and
indicated that if no motion to dismiss was made, it would consider
dismissal anyway. 5' This was the only case found where the court
considered dismissing the ancillary claim on its own motion. It could
be argued in such situations as Houff that ancillary jurisdiction never
really attached because a trial of the same set of facts could not dispose
of both the primary and ancillary claims.52

B. Ancillary Claim Not Dismissed
The mere fact that the principal claim was settled prior to trial has
not been determinative in all situations. In Oakes v. Graham Towing
Co.0 the principal case had been settled before trial, but the ancillary
third party claim was then tried, resulting in a verdict for the third
party plaintiff. The third party defendant then attacked the court's
jurisdiction to hear the ancillary claim since no independent grounds
45. Id., at 809-10. The policy considerations which supported the court's holding as
to the power to ajudicate the third party claim are also relevant when exercising the
discretion to ajudicate. Since no discretion was actually exercised in this case, obviously
the policy considerations could not have been utilized by the trial court.
46. Id., at 806.
47. Id., at 810.
48. Id., at 806.
49. Id., at 812 (dissenting opinion).
50. 202 F. Supp. 471 (W. D. Va. 1962), affd. 312 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1962).
51. Id., at 480. The question whether the trial court could dismiss the ancillary
claim on its own motion was not raised on appeal. It seems obvious that the third party
claim was dismissed, but it is uncertain whether it was dismissed on motion by one ofthe
parties or by the court on its own motion.
52. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
53. 135 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
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for jurisdiction had existed. Holding that jurisdiction existed, the trial
court held that jurisdiction was discretionary, to be exercised to
simplify procedure in accordance with Rule 14, and to avoid
unnecessary duplication and roundabout methods of disposing of
controversies. Significant to the decision was the fact that the ancillary
claim had been tried before any mention of jurisdiction was made. The
same result under similar circumstances occurred in Murphy v. Kodz4
which held that the trial court did not lose its power to ajudicate the
ancillary claim and could do so in its discretion; and where no
discretion had been actually exercised in the case, ajudication of the
non-federal claim would not be grounds for reversal when the
appellants failed to bring such discretionary matters to the court's
attention. The Murphy court did not base its holding on any
considerations of judicial economy, but based it on estoppel of the
appellants to assert abuse of discretion since they never gave the court
cognizance of such discretionary powers before the ancillary claim had
been tried. To hold otherwise would encourage litigants to make two
attempts for victory by refusing to assert the issue of discretion until
their case had been lost on the merits. It seems that the Murphy court
would have required dismissal of the ancillary claim had the appellants
raised the issue before it had been tried.," Thus, the mere fact that the
primary claim is settled before trial is not determinative of the
dismissal of the third party claim if there is an unreasonable delay in
the motion to dismiss it. The motion to dismiss should be made
immediately after the primary claim has been dismissed. Waiting until
after the ancillary claim has been fully litigated before raising the issue
is asking the trial court to stretch its discretion to, if not beyond, its
limits. However, it does seem that the ancillary claim may be dismissed
by the trial court on its own motion.56 In fact, where considerations.of
judicial economy arise, the trial court should not hesitate in dismissing
the ancillary claim.
Where the statute of limitations would bar recovery on the
ancillary claim if required to be asserted in a new action in the state
courts, the court in Southern Milling Co. v. United States 7 held that
54. 351 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1965).
55. See Wham-O-Mfg. Co. v. Paradise Mfg. Co., 327 F.2d 748, 752-54 (9th Cir.
1964) which was cited by Murphy v. Kodz, 351 F.2d 163, 168 (9th Cir. 1965).
56. United States v. Houff, 202 F. Supp. 471 (D. Va. 1962), affd, 312 F.2d 6 (4th
Cir. 1962).
57. 270 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1959).
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dismissal of the ancillary claim was an abuse of discretion even though
the principal claim had been decided by summary judgment before
trial. Certainly, if discretion is to be exercised, this result must follow to
prevent a third party plaintiff from having to bring two suits at the
same time, concerning the same set of facts, in both the federal and
state courts in order to protect himself from being without a remedy
should the suit against him in federal court be settled or dismissed after
the statute of limitations has run on his claim against the third party
defendant. Fairness to the litigants dictates the Southern Milling Co.
result.
Where extensive interrogatories have been filed and answered and
other pre-trial motions have taken place after the principal claim has
been settled and dismissed, but before the motion to dismiss the
ancillary calim has been made, it has been held that the ancillary claim
should not be dismissed.58 Considerations of judicial economy
probably controlled this result, but it would seem that such a result
should occur only in those states where the state courts will not
recognize the discovery methods of the federal courts. Only then will
any extensive efforts on anyone's part be wasted. 5VI.

DISMISSAL OF THE PRINCIPAL CLAIM AFTER TRIAL HAS BEGUN

Ordinarily, the ancillary claim should not be dismissed if the
principal claim has been dismissed after trial has begun.

Considerations of judicial economy weigh heavily in such situations.
But there still may be some situations where it would be better to
dismiss the ancillary claim. In Gibbs the Court said:
[t]he issue whether pendent [ancillary] jurisdiction has been
properly assumed is one which remains open throughout the
litigation. Pretrial procedures or even the trial itself may reveal a

substantial hegemony of state law claims, or likelihood of jury
confusion, which could not have been anticipated at the pleading
stage. Although it will of course be appropriate to take account in
58. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir.
1962); Day v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 172 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
59. Eg., South Carolina Circuit Court Rule 87 provides:
When an action in any court of the United States or any state has been
dismissed and another action involving the same subject matter is
afterward brought by the same parties .

. .,

all depositions lawfully taken

and filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally
taken therefor.
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this circumstance of the already completed course of the litigation,
dismissal of the state claim might even then be merited. 60

In Gibbs the principal claim was not dismissed until after the trial on
its merits when the trial judge granted a judgment n.o.v. No abuse of
discretion was found in then ajudicating the ancillary claim.
It was held in Duke v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.6 that the

trial court had not abused its discretion in dismissing a third party
claim after the merits of the principal claim had been decided. The
same set of facts did not exist in the ancillary claim that existed in the
primary claim, indicating that impleader had been improvidently
granted initially. All that was left to be litigated was a separate and
2
distinct controversy between parties having a common citizenship.
Although the entire controversy did stem from the same subject matter,
a construction contract, the main suit related to a contract of guaranty
and the ancillary claim related to an alleged fraudulent breach of a
subcontract. Therefore, all criteria dictated dismissal of the third party
claim. The court implied that had the same factual proofs been
common to both the principal and ancillary claims, dismissal of the
ancillary claim, after deciding the principal one, would have been an
abuse of discretion.Y
In Paliaga v. Luckenbach Steamship Co.6" it was held that the

trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the ancillary claim
after the principal claim had been settled. There had been a trial lasting
eight days where evidence involving the.ancillary claim had been heard;
two and a half years had elapsed since the filing of the ancillary claim

and its dismissal; the possibility of a plea of res judicata existed on
certain issues; and no other judge at the outset would be as familiar
with the facts of the case and the issues involved. This is a good
example of the proper discretionary application of ancillary
jurisdiction. Considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and
fairness to the litigants all played an important part in the decision
reached.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

383
209
Id.,
Id.
301

U.S. 715, at 727 (1966).
F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 966 (1954).
at 208.
F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1962).
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VII.

SEPARATION OF PRINCIPAL AND ANCILLARY CLAIMS

When the principal and ancillary claims have been completely
separated for trial, ordinarily the ancillary claim should be dismissed.
Authority for dismissal in such a situation can be found in Gibbs where
it was stated that jurisdiction of the pendent (ancillary) claim should be
refused when, due to the likelihood of jury confusion in treating
divergent legal theories of relief, the state (ancillary) and federal
(principal) claims are separated for trial pursuant to Rule 42(b).15
While Rule 14 specifically allows for separation of issues for separate
trials under Rule 42(b), it would seem that this would apply only when
issues common to both the principal and ancillary claims are separated
from other common issues and not when the two claims themselves are
separated. For example, if both breach of contract and negligence are
issues in the principal and third party claims, requiring proof of
separate sets of facts to establish each claim, the trial judge might
separate the issues for purposes of trial. Issues common to the primary
and third party claim are therefore separated and the third party must
not be dismissed. But if the primary claim is based solely on negligence
and the third party claim solely on contract, each claim requiring proof
of separate sets of facts, separation of the issues for trial would
completely separate the principal claim from the third party claim. The
third party claim should, therefore, be dismissed unless independent
grounds of jurisdiction exist. Any other applicatin of Rule 42(b) in
third party actions would frustrate the end that Rule 14 was intended to
accomplish." Dismissal of the ancillary claim in such cases would not
be contradictory to the basic purpose of Rule 14 and ancillary
jurisdiction which is to prevent inconsistent results by separate trials of
67
the same set of facts.
This was not the result which was reached in McDonald v. Blue
Jeans Corp. s8 where the principal claim was separated from the
65. 383 U.S. at 727; IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 422, at 645; But see WRIGHT § 76,
at 333. Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The court, in furtherance of convenience to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a
separate trial of any. . . third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of
any number of . . . third-party claims, or issues, always preserving
inviolate the right of trial by jury. ...
66. IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 422, at 644; see WRIGHT § 76, at 333.
67. Id.
68. 183 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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ancillary claim and settled during the separate trial. The court not only
refused to grant the motion to dismiss the ancillary claim but allowed
the third party plaintiff to assert a new claim against some of the
ancillary third party defendants. All the parties in the separate
ancillary trial were corporations and citizens of the same state. The
court reasoned that in order to effectuate the purpose of Rule 14, such
result was required so that complete relief may be given to all parties
involved. This case seems clearly wrong. The other purposes of Rule 14
and ancillary jurisdiction are overlooked 9 when such a result occurs.
When the main claim was separated from the ancillary one, two
separate and distinct controversies existed, the latter of which was
nothing more than a suit between litigants of the same state; no
prejudice from inconsistent ajudications on the same set of facts could
possibly have resulted in this case; and since .separate trials were
required, judicial economy would have been better served by dismissal
of the third party claim. The court may have had the power to continue
to ajudicate the ancillary claim, but to do so was certainly an abuse of
its discretion.
VIII.

DISMISSAL OF PRINCIPAL CLAIM ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

While discretionary adjudicatory power over the ancillary claim
exists in the trial court after the principal claim has been dismissed on
its merits, such is not the rule when the principal claim has been
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Every case which dealt with the
issue held that the federal court had no power to ajudicate the ancillary

claim if it did not have power to ajudicate the primary claim.7 No case
has been found where such a rule was applied to third party actions.
Since Rule 82 provides that the Federal Rules cannot extend federal
jurisdiction, Rule 14, unable by its own provisions to confer
jurisdiction over the third party claim, must be controlled by the rule of

law set out in these other cases involving ancillary jurisdiction. One
Rule 14 case, through dicta, did recognize that if the principal claim
has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, dismissal of the ancillary
claim would be required."
69. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra; IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 422, at

644.
70. Kelleam v. Maryland Cas. Co., 312 U.S. 377 (1941); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237 (1934); 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.26, at 708 (2d ed. 1968).
71. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843, at 845 (3d
Cir. 1962).
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The problem is recognizing when the court has power as compared
to discretion to ajudicate the ancillary claim. In Gibbs the Court said
that the question of jurisdictional power will ordinarily be resolved on
the pleadings.12 In that case the Court was considering federal question
jurisdiction, where the allegations in the pleadings are all that is
examined to determine if a substantial federal question has been
presented.73 Therefore, a determination after the pleading stage that the
principal claim does not present a substantial federal question does not
divest the court of its power to ajudicate the ancillary claim, but is only
a determination on the merits of the principal claim.
The rule is different in cases where jurisdiction of the principal
claim is based on diversity of citizenship. When the jurisdictional
amount is questioned, the plaintiff will be required to offer additional
proofs to establish to a legal certainty that the jurisdictional amount is
in controversy. 74 This could occur in the discovery stage when certain
facts are discovered which indicate that the amount in controversy is
less than the jurisdictional amount. The court loses jurisdiction of the
principal claim when this legal certainty is not proved," and
jurisdiction of the ancillary claim is also lost. If diversity of citizenship
is discovered not to have existed between the original parties when the
action was commenced, the court will lack power to ajudicate the
principal claim76 regardless of what stage of the suit the discovery was
made. The court will therefore lack power to ajudicate the ancillary
claim. It is apparent that a federal court may lose its power to ajudicate
at a later stage in a diversity case than it would in a federal question
case.
When the court loses its jurisdiction over the principal claim due
to mootness, a different rule applies, and the court in its discretion can
ajudicate the ancillary claim. 77 The reason is that mootness is
frequently a matter beyond the control of either party and may not
occur until after substantial time and energy have been expended in
litigating the principal claim. 7 8 It is significant that neither party has
control over that which causes the court to lose jurisdiction.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

383 U.S. at 727 (1966).
See WRIGHT § 18.
1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 24, at 106-107; WRIGHT § 33, at I 1I.
Id.
WRIGHT § 28.
Rosado v. Wyman, 90 S. Ct. 1207 (1970).
Id., at 1214.
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IX. SUMMARY

When a federal court has jurisdiction over a controversy between
the original plaintiff and defendant, it also has jurisdiction over the
third party claim even though no independent grounds of jurisdiction
exist. Although the principal claim may be dismissed on its merits, the
court still has power to adjudicate the third party claim. However, in its
discretion it may dismiss the ancillary claim due to considerations of
judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to parties. Ordinarily the
ancillary claim should be dismissed when the principal claim has been
settled before trial, when the ancillary and primary claims cannot be
disposed of in one trial, and when the ancillary and primary claims
have been completely separated for trial pursuant to Rule 42(b). The
ancillary claim should not be dismissed when it has since become timebarred, extensive discovery proceedings have taken place which cannot
be used in the state courts, the trial has already begun, and when the
discretionary power to dismiss has not been brought to the court's
attention until after the trial of the ancillary claim. No discretion exists
to dispose of the ancillary claim if the principal claim is dismissed for
lack of federal jurisdiction, and the ancillary claim must fall unless
there is independent jurisdiction to support it.
JETER
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